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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
At issue in this case is the application of regulatory 
provisions of the Waterfront Commission Compact ("the 
Compact") to a company that transports by water certain 
merchandise, primarily trucks and automobiles, that it 
claims it owns. The Compact is an interstate agreement 
entered into between New York and New Jersey with the 
consent of Congress. See N.J. Stat. Ann.S 32:23-1 et seq.; 
N.Y. Unconsol. Law S 9801 et seq. (McKinney); Waterfront 
Commission Compact, ch. 407, 67 Stat. 541 (1953). The 
Compact, which regulates the employment of waterfront 
labor in the Port of New York district, established the 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor ("the 
Commission"). See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-7. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Commission and permanently enjoined appellant, 
Elizabeth-Newark Shipping ("ENS") from employing 
unregistered waterfront labor. The court also assessed 
statutory penalties and fees against ENS. ENS appeals. 
 
II. 
 
ENS purchases cars and trucks in the United States and 
transports them to Haiti, where the vehicles are then sold. 
In late 1994, ENS used Construction and Marine 
Equipment Co. ("CME") as a stevedore to load vehicles onto 
ships that ENS chartered. Because CME was not a 
stevedore licensed pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-12, 
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as required by the Compact, the District Court, following 
suit by the Waterfront Commission, enjoined CME from 
acting as a stevedore. See Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. 
Harbor v. Construction & Marine Equip. Co., 928 F. Supp. 
1388 (D.N.J. 1996). ENS thereupon moved its loading 
operations to its own facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, 
where it used its own employees to load the goods onto 
ships, chartered by ENS, bound for Haiti. The parties 
dispute whether ENS actually owned all of the goods that it 
shipped. It is undisputed that the labor that ENS used in 
loading its ships was not registered pursuant to the 
Compact. 
 
After an investigation, the Commission, in a series of 
letters to ENS, advised it that although ENS was not 
required to hold a stevedore's license, the company could 
not legally employ unlicensed and unregistered waterfront 
labor for the loading of the ships. When ENS failed to 
conform its practices as directed, the Commission brought 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey against ENS, seeking injunctive relief, statutory 
penalties, and assessments. The District Court granted a 
preliminary injunction in favor of the Commission in 
September 1996. In May 1998, the District Court granted 
the Commission's motion for summary judgment and 
permanently enjoined ENS from employing unlicensed pier 
superintendents and unregistered longshoremen for the 
loading of its ships. See Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor 
v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 500 
(D.N.J. 1998). ENS timely filed this appeal. 
 
Subject-matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. Although the Compact is a creature of state 
legislatures, it is federalized by virtue of congressional 
approval pursuant to the Compact Clause of the 
Constitution, art. I, S 10, cl. 3. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 
U.S. 716, 719 (1985) ("[A] congressionally sanctioned 
interstate compact within the Compact Clause . . . is a 
federal law subject to federal construction."); Cuyler v. 
Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) ("[W]here Congress has 
authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, 
and where the subject matter of that agreement is an 
appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the 
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consent of Congress transforms the States' agreement into 
federal law under the Compact Clause."). 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
Our review of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. 
 
III. 
 
The Compact was enacted to eliminate corrupt hiring 
practices on the New York Harbor waterfront. See Hazelton 
v. Murray, 21 N.J. 115, 120-23, 121 A.2d 1, 3-5 (1956) 
(reviewing legislative history). To this end, the Compact 
regulates the employment of waterfront labor by, inter alia, 
requiring that stevedoring companies and pier 
superintendents be licensed by the Commission in order to 
perform their functions in the Port of New York District,1 
and that laborers be placed on the Commission's register of 
longshoremen before they can load and unload waterborne 
freight in the district. See N.J. Stat. Ann.SS 32:23-19 
(stevedores), 32:23-12 (pier superintendents), 32:23-27 
(longshoremen). The Commission may refuse, revoke or 
suspend registration to longshoremen with certain criminal 
backgrounds or who constitute a danger to public peace 
and safety. N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 32:23-29, -31, and -45 to -51. 
The Commission may seek civil penalties and injunctive 
relief for violations of the Compact's requirements. See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. SS 32:23-89 (civil penalties), 32:23-90 (civil 
enforcement). 
 
The parties disagree as to whether ENS falls within the 
regulatory purview of the Compact. The principal dispute 
between the parties concerns whether ENS is a "carrier of 
freight by water" within the intendment of the Compact, 
and thus subject to its requirements with respect to 
waterfront labor. The parties are, however, united in their 
disagreement with the reasoning of the District Court, 
which concluded that the controversy could be decided 
without reference to that term. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The geographical boundaries of the Port of New York District are 
described in N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:1-3. The area covered includes the New 
York and New Jersey sides of the New York Harbor. 
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A. 
 
The Compact provides that "no person shall employ 
another to work as a longshoreman within the Port of New 
York district unless at the time such other person is 
included in the longshoremen's register." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 32:23-27. With respect to pier superintendents, the 
Compact directs that "no person shall act as a pier 
superintendent or as a hiring agent within the port of New 
York district without first having obtained from the 
commission a license." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-12. To 
determine whether a person is a longshoreman or a pier 
superintendent, and thus employable only under the 
specified conditions, it is necessary to consult the statutory 
definitions. 
 
The Compact defines "pier superintendent" as 
 
       any natural person other than a longshoreman who is 
       employed for work at a pier or other waterfront 
       terminal by a carrier of freight by water or a stevedore 
       and whose work at such pier or other waterfront 
       terminal includes the supervision, directly or indirectly, 
       of the work of longshoremen. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-6. 
 
The Compact defines "longshoreman" in relevant part as 
 
       a natural person, other than a hiring agent, who is 
       employed for work at a pier or other waterfront 
       terminal, either by a carrier of freight by water or by a 
       stevedore, 
 
       (a) physically to move waterborne freight on vessels 
       berthed at piers, on piers or at other waterfront 
       terminals . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32-23-6. Under both of those definitional 
sections, the employee, whether "longshoreman" or "pier 
superintendent," must be employed by either a"stevedore" 
or a "carrier of freight by water." 
 
The Compact also contains a number of "supplementary 
definitions" that were enacted in 1969. Among these is a 
further definition of "longshoreman": 
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       "Longshoreman" shall also include a natural person, 
       other than a hiring agent, who is employed for work at 
       a pier or other waterfront terminal 
 
        (a) either by a carrier of freight by water or by a 
       stevedore physically to perform labor or services 
       incidental to the movement of waterborne freight on 
       vessels berthed at piers, on piers or at other waterfront 
       terminals . . . or 
 
        (b) by any person physically to move waterborne 
       freight to or from a barge, lighter or railroad car for 
       transfer to or from a vessel of a carrier of freight by 
       water which is, shall be, or shall have been berthed at 
       the same pier or other waterfront terminal, or 
 
        (c) by any person to perform labor or services 
       involving, or incidental to, the movement of freight at a 
       waterfront terminal as defined in subdivision (10) of 
       this section. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32-23-85. There is no comparable 
supplementary definition for "pier superintendent." 
 
The District Court, relying on subsection (c) of this 
supplementary definition of longshoreman, as well as a New 
Jersey Supreme Court decision interpreting this provision, 
ruled that there was no need to determine whether ENS 
qualifies as a "carrier of freight by water" because " `the 
1969 amendments eliminated from the definition of 
longshoreman [and hiring agent] the requirement that a 
person be employed by a carrier of freight by water.' " 
Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 502-03 
(quoting Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Harbor v. Mercedes- 
Benz of North America Inc., 99 N.J. 402, 493 A.2d 504 (N.J. 
1985)). The District Court noted that the 1969 amendments 
did not effect a comparable redefinition of "pier 
superintendent" but concluded that pier superintendents 
were "subsumed by the updated definition of 
`longshoreman.' " 3 F. Supp. 2d at 503. Accordingly, the 
District Court held that a finding that ENS was a "carrier 
of freight by water" was unnecessary with respect to the 
question whether ENS was required to utilize licensed pier 
superintendents for the supervision of longshore workers. 
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In their briefs, both parties argue that the District Court 
erred in its legal conclusion that the 1969 amendment to 
the definition of "longshoreman" obviates the need to 
determine whether ENS is a "carrier of freight by water" as 
a prerequisite for application of the Compact's rules 
regarding pier superintendents and longshoremen. We 
agree. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Mercedes- 
Benz provides a elucidative discussion of the background of 
the 1969 amendments. In that case, the Commission 
sought to enjoin Mercedes-Benz from employing 
unregistered hiring agents and longshoremen who prepared 
automobiles that had been imported by ocean carriers for 
delivery to dealers. The trial court, as well as the 
intermediate appellate court, had concluded that the 
Compact's requirements did not apply to Mercedes-Benz 
because the employees did not work at a pier or other 
waterfront terminal and did not involve the movement of 
freight. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. The 
Court noted that before the 1969 amendments, the 
Compact required registration only for those longshoremen 
"who physically handled waterborne cargo on the piers and 
in the holds of ships but overlooked those who performed 
tasks incidental, but nevertheless essential, to the smooth 
flow of the freight." 99 N.J. at 411, 493 A.2d at 509 
(quoting Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 
Annual Report - 1968/69 at 11). After the industry turned 
to containerization, contractors and companies could 
handle cargo in warehouses located away from the piers. 
 
The containerization process involves the loading of 
freight into large metal boxes, which are in turn loaded 
onto a truck frame or railroad car and then raised onto a 
ship. See N.L.R.B. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 
AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 64 (1985). The advent of the 
containerization phenomenon created a problem for the 
Commission in that the contractors and workers who 
loaded containers were not "stevedores" or "longshoremen" 
as then defined under the Compact because they did not 
load ships berthed at piers, but rather loaded containers 
that later were hoisted onto ships; thus the Compact 
"overlooked those who performed tasks incidental, but 
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nonetheless essential to, the smooth flow of the freight." 
Mercedes-Benz, 99 N. J. at 411; 493 A.2d at 509. This left 
new positions uncovered, subject to infiltration by those 
very elements the Compact was designed to exclude. 
 
Consequently, acting on the Commission's proposal, the 
legislatures of the two states expanded the definition of 
longshoreman in 1969 to bring these workers within the 
Commission's jurisdiction. Mercedes-Benz, 99 N.J. at 413, 
493 A.2d at 510. The legislation was amended to cover, in 
addition to traditional longshore workers who load goods 
directly onto ships, those workers who handle freight 
ultimately destined for ships but which was loaded into 
containers at locations other than piers. Id. It effected this 
change by including as longshoremen those who work for 
entities other than stevedores or carriers of freight by 
water, but who nonetheless handle freight that will be or 
was carried by a carrier of freight by water. When the 
Mercedes-Benz Court stated that "the 1969 amendments 
eliminated from the definition of longshoreman the 
requirement that a person be employed by a carrier of 
freight by water or by a stevedore," id. at 413, it explained 
that change as representing "a means of asserting 
jurisdiction over employees who had been removed from 
pier employment because of misconduct but who 
subsequently returned to the waterfront to work on cargo in 
warehouses and consolidating depots." Id. at 413-14, 493 
A.2d at 510. In fact, the Mercedes-Benz Court then stated 
that its consideration of "the policy of the [Compact] in its 
entirety, as disclosed by its legislative history," id. at 414, 
493 A.2d at 510, led it to conclude that "those employee of 
[Mercedes-Benz] who performed services on vehicles 
`incidental to their movement' as freight were subject to 
registration as longshoreman and that the persons by 
whom they were selected for employment were subject to 
licensing as hiring agents." Id. at 416-17, 493 A.2d at 512. 
 
This history bears out the Commission's argument before 
us that "[t]his case has nothing to do with the waterfront 
activities which gave rise to the 1969 Amendments . . . but 
is concerned with `traditional' waterfront operations." 
Appellee's Brief at 8. In contrast to the issue that was 
before the Court in Mercedes-Benz, we are concerned here 
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with employees who are performing traditional 
longshoremen waterfront activity. 
 
As noted above, the district court ruled that the 1969 
amendments redefined "longshoreman" so as to eliminate 
the employment by a "carrier of freight by water" as a 
prerequisite for falling within the regulatory authority of the 
Compact. We focus on subsection (c) of the supplementary 
definitions of "longshoreman" in S 32:23-85, as it is plain 
that subsections (a) and (b) contain the "carrier of freight by 
water" qualification. Subsection (c) defines "longshoreman" 
broadly as "a natural person, other than a hiring agent, 
who is employed for work at a pier or other waterfront 
terminal . . . by any person to perform labor or services 
involving, or incidental to, the movement of freight at a 
waterfront terminal as defined in subdivision (10) of this 
section." Significantly, this definition specifically limits the 
definition of "longshoreman" to one who moves "freight" as 
defined in subsection (10). That provision reads: " `freight' 
means freight which has been or will be, carried by or 
consigned for carriage by a carrier of freight by water." N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 32:23-85(10). 
 
Accordingly, we agree with the parties that the term 
"carrier of freight by water" remains an essential term in 
the definition of a longshoreman. Even though, under the 
1969 amendments, a laborer need not be employed by a 
carrier of freight by water in order to qualify as a 
longshoremen, a laborer who "perform[s] labor or services 
involving or incidental to, the movement of" goods that are, 
or will be, carried by a carrier of freight by water falls 
within the definition of a longshoreman. 
 
It follows that the District Court erred insofar as it 
concluded that the amendments dispensed with the term 
"carrier of freight by water" as an essential term in that 
definition. That is, it failed to acknowledge that although 
the 1969 amendment eliminated the requirement that a 
longshoreman be employed by a stevedore or carrier of 
freight by water, the amendment continued to ensure that 
the Compact's purview extended to those who handle 
freight "which has been or will be carried . . . by a carrier 
of freight by water." N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 32:23-85(6)(c) & (10). 
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In sum, the Compact defines "longshoremen" as those 
laborers who either (1) handle waterborne freight as 
employees of a "stevedore" or a "carrier of freight by water," 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-6, or (2) handle freight destined for 
carriage by a "carrier of freight by water" while employed by 
"any person." S 32:23-85 (c). As the parties agree, ENS is 
not a stevedore. But as long as the ENS employees hired to 
load vehicles onto its chartered ships are employees of a 
carrier of freight by water or are handling freight bound for 
carriage by such an entity, they must be registered 
pursuant to the Compact. 
 
Furthermore, as previously pointed out, the 1969 
amendment did not change the definition of "pier 
superintendent." Thus, "pier superintendents" continue to 
be defined as supervisors of waterfront labor employed by 
a stevedore or carrier of freight by water. The District Court 
acknowledged that the 1969 amendment did not broaden 
the definition of pier superintendent as it did with respect 
to longshoremen, but concluded that "that vocation is now 
subsumed by the updated definition of `longshoreman.' " 
However, it is doubtful that the legislatures would have, by 
means of a supplementary definition of "longshoreman," 
undertaken, sub silentio, to render a separate definition in 
another section of the statute superfluous. But there is no 
need to decide this question. Even if we assume arguendo 
that the supplementary definition of "longshoreman" 
was meant to trump the earlier definition of "pier 
superintendent," our analysis would not differ. Because the 
1969 amendment retains "carrier of freight by water" as an 
essential term in the definition of "longshoreman," this 
essential term perforce applies to "pier superintendents" as 
well. 
 
Therefore, the question that remains for decision is 
whether ENS is a "carrier of freight by water." 
 
B. 
 
ENS takes the position that it is not a "carrier of freight 
by water" because it handles only its own goods, and 
therefore need not hire registered longshoremen or licensed 
pier superintendents. The Commission responds, arguing 
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that (1) as a matter of statutory construction, the 
Compact's requirements apply to companies that handle 
their own goods, and (2) the record does not support ENS's 
contention that it handled its own goods. 
 
The Compact defines "carrier of freight by water" as 
 
       any person who may be engaged or who may hold 
       himself out as willing to be engaged, whether as a 
       common carrier, as a contract carrier or otherwise. . . 
       in the carriage of freight by water between any point in 
       the Port of New York district and a point outside said 
       district. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-6 (emphasis added). 
 
In ENS's view, this definition should be understood as 
being confined to carriers for hire--that is, those who carry 
the goods of another for compensation. Invoking the 
principle of ejusdem generis,2  ENS urges that the 
qualification "whether as a common carrier, as a contract 
carrier or otherwise" compels the conclusion that the 
legislation is directed only toward those entities that carry 
freight for others. It argues that an entity that ships its own 
goods is sufficiently dissimilar from the kinds of carriers 
listed in the definition that ejusdem generis principles 
require us to conclude that the statute excludes those who 
ship their own goods. This argument fails to persuade. 
 
The principle of ejusdem generis, as this court has 
emphasized, "is not a rule of law but merely a useful tool 
of construction resorted to in ascertaining legislative intent. 
The rule should not be employed when the intention of the 
legislature is otherwise evident." United States v. Frumento, 
563 F.2d 1083, 1090 (3d Cir. 1977). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Black's Law Dictionary defines the principle of ejusdem generis thus: 
 
       where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by 
       words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are 
       not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as 
       applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or 
class 
       as those specifically mentioned. 
 
Black's Law Dictionary 517 (6th ed. 1990). 
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The Compact was designed to root out corruption and to 
improve the conditions under which waterfront labor was 
employed. The Compact makes the following "Findings and 
Declarations:" 
 
       The States of New Jersey and New York hereby find 
       and declare that the conditions under which waterfront 
       labor is employed within the Port of New York district 
       are depressing and degrading to such labor, resulting 
       from the lack of any systematic method of hiring, the 
       lack of adequate information as to the availability of 
       employment, corrupt hiring practices and the fact that 
       persons conducting such hiring are frequently 
       criminals and persons notoriously lacking in moral 
       character and integrity and neither responsive or 
       responsible to the employers nor to the uncoerced will 
       of the majority of the members of the labor 
       organizations of the employees . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-2. 
 
Accordingly, the Compact undertakes to regulate the 
employment of waterfront labor through its licensing and 
registration scheme, a scheme by which those with criminal 
records are disqualified from holding positions as 
longshoremen or pier superintendents. N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 32:23-14(b) (making conviction of certain crimes grounds 
for denying license as pier superintendent or hiring agent); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-29(a) (allowing Commissioner to 
deny application for inclusion on longshoremen's register 
based on certain criminal convictions). 
 
In light of the statutory goals, and the means chosen to 
effect those goals, ENS's proffered interpretation of the 
definition of "carrier of freight by water" as applying only to 
those who carry freight belonging to someone else for hire 
is too restrictive. It is implausible that by using the phrase 
"whether as a common carrier, contract carrier or 
otherwise" the drafters of the Compact sought to root out 
criminality and degrading hiring conditions with respect to 
laborers who are employed by carriers for hire while 
excluding those companies who, like ENS, ship their own 
goods for sale outside of the Port of New York. 
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ENS proffers no reason why the legislatures of New York, 
New Jersey, and the United States would have done so. 
Were we to narrow the reach of the statute in the name of 
ejusdem generis, we would subvert the manifest purpose of 
the Compact--remedying corrupt and degrading hiring 
practices within the district. Ejusdem generis should not 
"be applied to defeat the obvious purpose of the statute or 
to narrow the targets of Congressional concern.`The rule of 
"ejusdem generis" is applied as an aid in ascertaining the 
intention of the legislature, not to subvert it when 
ascertained.' " Frumento, 563 F.2d at 1090 (quoting Texas 
v. United States, 292 U.S. 522, 534 (1934)). 
 
If the legislatures that drafted the Compact had intended 
to restrict the definition of "carrier of freight by water" to 
businesses that carry freight for others for compensation, 
the linguistic tools with which to do so were readily 
available. In fact, as the Commission argues, the Compact's 
definition of "stevedore" contains the very kind of restriction 
that ENS argues should be read into the definition of 
"carrier of freight by water. The Compact, in relevant part, 
defines "stevedore" as "a contractor (not including an 
employee) engaged for compensation pursuant to a contract 
or arrangement with a carrier of freight by water, in moving 
waterborne freight carried or consigned for carriage by such 
carrier." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-6 (emphasis added). That 
the Compact specifically limits the definition of "stevedore" 
to those who provide services to others for compensation 
but omits any comparable restriction in the definition of 
"carrier of freight by water" supports our conclusion that 
the Compact does not contemplate an exemption from its 
requirements pertaining to longshoremen and pier 
superintendents for those companies that ship their own 
goods out of the Port of New York district. 
 
Accordingly, we construe the "or otherwise" language to 
apply to those persons and entities that ship commercial 
freight to which they hold title as well as to those who ship 
freight on behalf of others.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that the New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected a similar 
contention by Mercedes-Benz that "freight" is confined to goods handled 
by others, and ruled "the phrase `employed * * * by any person' 
contained in the [1969] amendments' redefinition of `longshoreman' 
clearly can include an owner of the goods, such as Mercedes-Benz." 
Mercedes Benz, 99 N.J. at 416, 493 A.2d at 512. 
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We also reject ENS's contention that because 
Commission Regulation 3.2(c) provides that a carrier of 
freight by water shall not require a stevedore license when 
it provides such services on its own account, "it follows that 
one is not a carrier of freight by water" when performing 
services for one's own account. By its terms, this regulation 
concerns stevedores, which, as noted above, are defined as 
contractors who provide loading services for others. The 
import of this regulation is that a carrier of freight by water 
that performs its loading services in-house, as opposed to 
utilizing the services of a stevedore, need not have a 
stevedore's license. This regulation does not speak to the 
meaning of "carrier of freight by water," much less carve 
out an exemption from the Compact's requirements 
regarding the hiring of registered longshoremen and 
licensed pier superintendents. Rather, as we previously 
explained, this specific licensing exemption for carriers who 
ship their own goods serves to make the legislatures' failure 
to exempt such carriers from the Compact's requirements 
regarding pier superintendents and hiring agents all the 
more telling. 
 
Similarly, we reject ENS's reliance on the Shipping Act of 
1916, 46 App. U.S.C. S 801, as amended by the Shipping 
Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. SS 1701-1720, and the Commerce 
Act, 49 U.S.C. S 13102. The primary purpose of the 
Shipping Act, which regulates common carriers of goods by 
water in interstate and foreign commerce, is to eliminate 
discriminatory treatment of shippers and carriers. See 
United States Navigation Co. v. Canard SS Co., 284 U.S. 
474, 480-81 (1932). The Interstate Commerce Act 
establishes a regulatory framework similar to that of the 
Shipping Act, but the Interstate Commerce Act applies only 
to inland shippers. Both of those statutes are concerned 
primarily with the regulation of the rates that shippers 
charge to their customers, see Thorne Bledsoe McCallister, 
The Filed Rate Doctrine Under the Interstate Commerce Act 
and the Shipping Acts, 19 Tul. Mar. L.J. 81, 81-82 (1994), 
a feature that distinguishes them from the Compact, which 
is concerned with the regulation of labor hiring within the 
Port of New York district. It thus stands to reason that the 
Shipping Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, in seeking 
to prevent discriminatory shipping rates, are limited to 
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those entities that transport goods for others. Hence, these 
statutes do not shed any light on the issue before the court. 
 
In conclusion, we hold that the Compact's definition of 
"carrier of freight by water" applies to persons who load 
their own goods onto vessels within the port of New York 
district and ship them for commercial purposes outside of 
that district. This conclusion gives full effect to the goals 
animating the Compact and therefore accords with its 
construction provision, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 32:23-72, which 
states: "In accordance with the ordinary rules for 
construction of interstate compacts this compact shall be 
liberally construed to eliminate the evils described therein 
and to effectuate the purposes thereof." Because we 
conclude that the Compact's requirements extend to those 
who ship their own goods for commercial purposes, we 
need not reach the Commission's argument that ENS has 
failed to show that it was the owner of the cars that it 
shipped. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
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